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Abstract 
Path dependence as a concept in institutional theories has become increasingly popu-
lar in economics and other social sciences. The key idea is that in a sequence of events, 
the latter events are not (completely) independent from those that occurred in the 
past. Yet, common usage of the concept often subsumes two markedly different mod-
els and approaches to understand historical sequencing. The two main processes of 
the past shaping the future – diffusion and developmental pathways – must be distin-
guished analytically. This paper juxtaposes (1) the unplanned “trodden path” that 
takes shape through the subsequent repeated use by other individuals of that sponta-
neously chosen path, and (2) the “branching pathways” or juncture at which one of 
the available alternative pathways must be chosen in order to continue a journey. Fur-
thermore, the typical approaches and their explanatory purchase are discussed in ref-
erence to explanations of institutional change. The paper shows that the first path 
dependence theorem is too deterministic and inflexible, whereas the second approach 
is sufficiently supple to analyze various forms of institutional change. 
Zusammenfassung 
Pfadabhängigkeit wird in den Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften zunehmend als 
Konzept institutioneller Theorien angewendet. Der Grundgedanke ist, dass in einer 
Sequenz von Ereignissen (oder Entscheidungen) spätere nicht (vollkommen) unab-
hängig von vorangegangenen sind. Jedoch wird in gängigen Anwendungen des Kon-
zepts oft versäumt, nach zwei äußerst unterschiedlichen Verständnissen historischer 
Sequenzen zu differenzieren. Die zwei Prozesse der Strukturierung der Zukunft durch 
die Vergangenheit – Diffusionspfade und Entwicklungspfade – sollen analytisch ge-
trennt werden. Dieser Aufsatz unterscheidet (1) den zufälligen „Trampelpfad“, wel-
cher durch die vermehrte Benutzung eines Pfades spontan entsteht, von (2) dem 
„Scheideweg“, an dem einer der möglichen Pfade gewählt werden muss, um den Weg 
fortzusetzen. Im Weiteren wird der Erklärungsbeitrag der beiden Ansätze in Bezug auf 
die Erklärung institutionellen Wandels erörtert. Es zeigt sich, dass das erste Pfadab-
hängigkeitstheorem zu deterministisch und inflexibel ist, der zweite Pfadabhängig-
keitsansatz hingegen offen genug, unterschiedliche Formen institutionellen Wandels 
zu analysieren. 
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1 Introduction 
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, 
And sorry I could not travel both 
… 
And both that morning equally lay 
In leaves no step had trodden black. 
Oh, I kept the first for another day! 
Yet knowing how way leads on to way, 
I doubted if I should ever come back. 
… 
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I – 
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference.  
(Robert Frost, “The Road Not Taken,” 1916) 
Over the past two decades, path dependence has become an increasingly popular con-
cept in institutional theories in economics and other social sciences. Indeed, it has 
developed into a common “short hand” to indicate that the past shapes the future – in 
short: history matters. However, upon closer analysis, we find two distinctly different 
interpretations of path dependence that I would like to summarize in two metaphors. 
One common image is the unplanned “trodden trail” that emerges through the subse-
quent repeated use by others of a path spontaneously chosen by an individual. A dif-
ferent illustration is the “road juncture,” the branching point at which a person needs 
to choose one of the available pathways in order to continue the journey. The path 
dependence concept thus subsumes two markedly different approaches to understand 
historical sequencing. The two images of the “trodden trail” and the “road juncture” 
represent different social processes that in my view must be distinguished analytically: 
a persistent diffusion path and branching pathways. The first model stresses the spon-
taneous evolution of an institution and its subsequent long-term entrenchment; the 
second view looks at the interdependent sequence of events that structure the alterna-
tives for future institutional changes. 
Nevertheless, common to both approaches is the key idea that in a sequence of events, 
the latter decisions are not (entirely) independent from those that occurred in the 
past. In the language of probability theory, this sequential contingency is called path 
dependence. Path dependence results from non-linear self-reinforcing processes – in 
                                                        
This paper is based on a Habilitation lecture at the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences at the 
University of Cologne in 2003, a seminar at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in 
the same year, and an extended paper presented at the workshop on “Path Dependence” organized 
by Arbetslivsinstitutet held in Visby, Sweden, August 24–26, 2004. The author is grateful to the 
participants of the MPIfG seminar and Visby workshop for the discussions, and to Justin Powell 
(MPIB, Berlin), Raymund Werle (MPIfG, Cologne) and Sigrid Quack (WZB, Berlin) for their 
detailed comments. 
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economic terms: increasing returns.1 In a self-exemplifying manner, the adoption of 
the path dependence concept in economics since the mid-1980s and somewhat later 
in the other social sciences demonstrates such a self-reinforcing diffusion process. The 
astonishingly swift proliferation of the concept must be seen in the context of the re-
vival of institutional theories in economics, political science and sociology.2 Neo-
institutionalists embraced path dependence as empirical proof of the need to study 
institutions as resulting from dynamic social processes. We can also observe that some 
(sub-)disciplines, such as political sociology, depart more substantially from the initial 
use of path dependence in economics. Such recombining and enlarging the concept to 
be less restrictive or the “branching out” of different theoretical pathways resembles 
the second image of path dependence. 
Although definitions of institutions abound, they are commonly understood as social 
rules, norms and ideas (Leitideen) that guide, but also restrain, social behavior (North 
1990; Lepsius 1990). Seen from an anthropological perspective, institutions are immi-
nently functional: as “taken-for-granted” behavioral routines they ease everyday deci-
sion-making; as social norms they regulate social interaction; and as cognitive scripts 
they reduce uncertainty in a complex world. Since some form of stability is a precon-
dition for institutions to function, most theoretical and empirical analyses have fo-
cused thus far on the persistence of institutions (despite the use of “institutional 
change” in book titles, e.g. North 1990; Alston et al. 1996). Recently, institutional 
theorists in various disciplines have pointed out different social mechanisms that sta-
bilize institutions through path dependent self-reinforcing processes. For the record, 
it should be noted that the “old” institutionalists had already alluded to similar proc-
esses when referring to “institutionalization” (Stinchcombe 1968). 
The equally important questions of when and how institutions evolve and why they 
change have been less often studied by institutionalist researchers. Thus, in this paper, 
I raise the question of the degree to which we can explain institutional change with the 
help of the two mentioned path dependence approaches. What are the known social 
mechanisms of path dependent persistence? Could these also facilitate our explana-
tions of change? To address these questions, I proceed in three steps. First, I sketch the 
rather deterministic path dependence model that describes the repetition of one basic 
                                                        
1 In probability theory, “path independence” refers to the independence of two subsequent 
events: throwing a dice for a second time is unrelated to the first outcome, thus the probabil-
ity that a double six will be drawn is: 1/36 = 1/6.1/6. In contrast, “path dependence” de-
scribes cases in which the probability of a subsequent event is related to earlier events. In the 
case of a lottery, when we draw 6 out of 48 balls, the chances to get a particular number at first 
is 1/48, but at the second draw the chance is 1/47 since one ball has already been removed, 
and so on. 
2 As an introduction to institutional economics see (Sjöstrand 1993; Eggertsson 1996), in or-
ganizational sociology (DiMaggio/Powell 1991; Nee 1998) and political science (Hall /Taylor 
1996; Immergut 1998; Thelen 1999). 
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decision throughout a network of actors in a process of social diffusion. I discuss this 
model’s shortcomings in explaining institutional change, particularly when it is ap-
plied to social institutions. Second, I illustrate the diffusion-like process using exam-
ples from my own study of early retirement trends. Third, I introduce the alternative, 
more open path dependence concept and locate its potential for studying historical 
trajectories of institutional change. Fourth, I draw on institutionalist accounts of wel-
fare state reforms to indicate the use of the open pathway concept. Finally, I review 
the social mechanisms of self-reinforcing processes, discussing their potential use in 
explaining institutional change – not only institutional inertia. 
2 Path dependence I: “trodden trail” and the diffusion of an institution 
A path-dependent sequence of economic changes is one in which  
important influences upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by 
temporarily remote events, including happenings dominated by chance elements 
rather than systematic forces. (David, 1985: 332) 
During the early 1980s in the United States, economic historian Paul A. David and 
system theorist Brian W. Arthur developed the first explicit path dependence con-
cept.3 To model path dependence, Arthur used a polya urn with two differently col-
ored but equally sized sets of balls (Arthur 1994: Chapter 3). Every drawn ball is re-
turned to the urn and doubled by adding a ball of the same color, thus slightly in-
creasing the chances of drawing the same color in the next round. Even though it is 
always a random process, one color will dominate in the long run due to the positive 
feedback on already drawn balls of a particular color (the more one color is overrepre-
sented, the more likely it will be drawn in subsequent rounds). Only in the increas-
ingly unlikely event of a balancing out of both colors would there be no long-term 
positive feedback in either direction. 
QWERTY is probably the best known example of path dependence applied to techno-
logical innovation (David 1985): the keyboard layout of American typewriters was 
developed 130 years ago to cope with technical problems of mechanical typewriters, 
without considering a more efficient keyboard arrangement with respect to typing 
speed. As users invested in learning this established standard, more optimal alterna-
                                                        
3 Brian W. Arthur and Paul A. David both taught at Stanford University during the mid-1980s 
and had exchanged ideas on path dependence (see Arthur 1994: Preface). In 1983, Arthur pu-
blished his working paper on “increasing returns” with the International Institute for Applied 
System Analysis in Vienna, which was first published in an academic journal (Economic Jour-
nal) as late as 1989 (Arthur 1994: Chapter 2). His article in Scientific American of February 
1990 popularized “positive feedbacks.” David’s six-page QWERTY paper (David 1985) soon 
became a locus classicus for path dependence theory. 
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tive keyboards could not later overcome the predominance of QWERTY, even during 
the fundamental technology-driven switch from mechanical to electric typewriters 
and then to computer keyboards.4 The diffusion of this technological standard be-
came a self-reinforcing process: the more people learned to use this design, the less 
likely it was for competing keyboards to take over. 
Even though this prime example is drawn from the history of technological innova-
tions, the path dependence model based on the increasing return principle has often 
been applied to social institutions. Instead of the diffusion of a technology, the em-
phasis in such cases is on the societal acceptance of a social institution, for instance, 
the spontaneous emergence of a social convention. The time path plays a major role, 
with the diffusion process occurring slowly and sequentially as some institution dif-
fuses through a social network (see Figure 1). Like the image of the trodden trail, a 
spontaneous social convention emerges through accidental but repeated use: the more 
individuals follow suit, the more deeply engrained it becomes. Henceforth, the likeli-
hood that people will divert from it progressively declines. Whatever the reasons for 
its early success, once a critical mass of individuals has adopted the institution, the 
positive feedback process will stabilize the “trodden trail” as ever more people orient 
their decisions based on the perception that a sufficient number of other people have 
already done so. 
Four conditions are crucial for the “deterministic”5 path dependence theorem (Arthur 
1994: Chapter 7; cf. Ackermann 2001): 
1. The path dependence model assumes an equal starting condition with the same 
initial probability. Theoretically, there are multiple equilibria possible since 
which “path” will be taken depends on chance (tipping more frequently towards 
one color) during the early stages of the process. For instance, there is no a priori 
advantage of driving on the right or on the left; however, once a social conven-
tion has emerged, it will be very useful for any latecomer to adopt the common 
practice. 
                                                        
4 David (1984) explained the path dependent self-reinforcement with three mechanisms: sys-
tem interdependency between hardware (QWERTY keyboard) and software (speed of typing 
skills). Due to economies of scale, firms would buy QWERTY typewriters since ever more sec-
retaries had learned that new keyboard. Moreover, for individual secretaries the investment in 
learning QWERTY became a sunk cost; they were hardly willing to learn another new key-
board, especially as their employers were unwilling to pay for such training due to fear of poa-
ching by other employers.  
5 Following Mahoney (2000: 507), who argues “that path dependence characterizes specifically 
those historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or 
event chains that have deterministic properties,” I call this approach “deterministic.” 
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2. Self-reinforcing processes are the social mechanisms that are responsible for one 
alternative to take a lead over others. The diffusion of an institution occurs in 
particular through network effects. As more and more people adopt an innova-
tion, the return on its use will increase. For example, the more people are already 
using email, the higher the return for others to also adopt this means of com-
munication. 
Early chance events
Tipping point (critical mass)
Lock-in
b)  Diffusion curve
N
t
A
B
Figure 1 Path dependence I: trodden path
Self-reinforcement through network effect
t1
a)  Diffusion in a social network
t2 t3 t4
B
A
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3. As a consequence of these self-reinforcing processes, the once taken path will 
stabilize – a phenomenon commonly called “lock-in.” Its irreversibility derives 
from the fact that actors have already invested in the dominant path (“sunk 
costs”) and are thus unwilling to switch to an alternate one. Thus, changing 
from Windows to another operating system such as Linux may be costly, since 
one would have to learn to use the new system as well as replace all auxiliary 
software based on the Windows system. 
4. According to Arthur, path dependent processes can thus reinforce inefficient 
paths. As the model assumes multiple equilibria and early chance events tip the 
random walk towards one path, a suboptimal path – at least seen ex post and for 
society in general – may thus have emerged as persistent. In the case of key-
boards, even a more speed-efficient layout hardly has a chance to replace the old 
less efficient one since it would require overcoming not only the sunk costs for 
each individual user but also the coordination problem of getting enough old 
and new users to switch at the same time. 
From the perspective of economics, the inefficiency thesis is the most controversial, 
given that under unfettered market conditions, the most efficient innovation should 
prevail. Liebowitz and Margolis (1990, 1995, 1999) take issue with the inefficiency 
claim of path dependence theory, both theoretically and empirically.6 They distin-
guish three forms of path dependence, only the last version of which they see as con-
tradicting neoclassical economics. As per their definition, first degree path depend-
ence reflects a process in which an early chance event may have long-term unantici-
pated consequences without being inefficient (an unproblematic case for both theo-
ries). Second degree path dependence shows post ante inefficient long-term conse-
quences, yet individual actors decided rationally on the basis of information available 
at the time, that is, they would have decided otherwise if they had known. Finally, 
third degree path dependence is an inefficient outcome that would have been actually 
remediable: actors were aware that they deliberately chose a suboptimal solution. 
There are two problems with Liebowitz and Margolis critique (Ackermann 2001: 35). 
First, they seem to apply a narrow actor-centered perspective – as if the evolution of a 
path were solely related to the rational decisions of independent actors. Yet path de-
pendence is the evolutionary outcome of multi-actor collective interaction, thus an 
inefficient macro-level outcome (lock-in of a suboptimal institution) can well be the 
unintended consequence of the interaction of rational micro-level decisions by indi-
                                                        
6 David’s QWERTY story was criticized by Liebowitz and Margolis as a “fable” (Liebowitz/
Margolis 1990, 1995 and 1996), and they question whether there were indeed more (efficient) 
alternatives to QWERTY and whether its initial rise was such a chance event. Liebowitz and 
Margolis extended their criticisms to other common examples for path dependence in tech-
nology (VHS vs. Betamax) and raised doubts about the case of Microsoft (Liebowitz/Margolis 
1999). 
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vidual actors. Moreover, by requiring that a once taken path can be switched to rem-
edy inefficiency in their third degree definition, they assume that which the path de-
pendence theorem problematizes. The more the path becomes entrenched, the less 
likely it will be that the technology (or institution) can or will be easily replaced. It 
should be noted that Arthur and David both stressed that path dependence does not 
always and does not necessarily lead to inefficiency. For non-economists, the main 
concern is not the merits of the inefficiency thesis but the rather deterministic lock-in 
thesis that denies individual actors’ freedom of action and excludes the potential for 
change. 
Since the model assumes that small chance events in the early phase will have crucial 
long-term effects, both participating individuals and any researcher will find it diffi-
cult to predict which path will emerge in the future. Only ex post analyses will allow 
the tracing of paths. Similarly, the necessary critical mass (or tipping point) that has 
important effects in determining the final outcome of such a non-linear process can-
not be predetermined. It too can only be traced retrospectively through analysis of the 
diffusion curve. However, the model’s main problem is that it excludes the individual 
actors and their strategies as well as the social contexts in which these processes take 
place (Crouch/Farrell 2004): neither unequal resources at the start, nor the strategic 
action of individuals – who may seek to change course – are taken into account.7 
The deterministic path dependence model, in assuming the lasting impact of chance 
events at the beginning of but not later in the process, necessarily claims the inflexibil-
ity of institutions. But such “lock-in” of a path seems to be a rather unrealistic as-
sumption since it rules out even gradual adaptations of an institution to the environ-
ment that may be necessary for its long-term survival. Indeed, the polya urn model is 
a closed system with an internal feedback mechanism that increases the number of 
balls of the winning color. An end to the “lock-in” would only be possible through 
exogenous intervening factors, which are certainly outside the theoretical model. Thus, 
this “deterministic” model can only explain those hyper stable cases of path depend-
ence that follow the assumption of stochastic events and unobstructed self-reinforcing 
processes. 
                                                        
7 In business administration studies, the active creative role of (Schumpeterian) entrepreneurs 
and innovators is stressed and technological change occurs through path creation (Garud/
Karnøe 2001; but see also for Austrian institutional economics: Fu-Lai Yu 2001). Policy analy-
ses and organizational sociology similarly sometimes assume political entrepreneurs to play a 
crucial role (Beckert 1999). 
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3 Path dependence example I: unintended consequences of early retirement 
Let me illustrate the process of path dependent diffusion with an example from wel-
fare state research, the case of early retirement (see Figure 2) (Ebbinhaus 2006). Early 
exit from work has become a common social practice for employers to shed labor and 
for older workers to seek early retirement, particularly since the onset of mass unem-
ployment in the 1970s (Esping-Andersen 1996). Although public policies advanced by 
the state and social partners in the national arena provided multiple pathways into 
early retirement, the expansion of such programs was largely an unintended conse-
quence of policies not implemented with the explicit purpose of ever-earlier with-
drawal from the labor force. Instead, two actor constellations in and across work-
places have promoted the proliferation of this “social innovation”: the older workers 
(and workplace representatives) support early exits and the employers (and workplace 
representatives) use it for their own purposes. 
As early as the 1930s, sociologist Robert K. Merton delineated several social mecha-
nisms for such unintended consequences as a result of diffusion processes (Merton 
1936). His well-known example delineates how the rumor of bankruptcy can lead to a 
Figure 2 Example of path dependence I: early retirement
 
Externalization coalitionQuasi social rights
Social Policy Bargaining
Unintended diffusion Expectations of early exit
Workers
Personnel policyEarly exit pathways
State
Labor relations
Trade
unions
Works 
council
Employer
associations
Employer
Early exit from work
Welfare-related
“pull”
Production-related
“push”
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self-fulfilling prophecy: as panicked depositors withdraw their funds, the bank indeed 
falls into insolvency. Moreover, Merton also pointed out the impact of social com-
parison (with peers) and social expectations as social mechanisms that have large-
scale consequences (Merton 1967). Both processes play a role in explaining the expan-
sion of early retirement and the subsequent difficulties to reverse its course, particu-
larly in Continental Europe (Ebbinghaus 2000). While there are welfare related “pull” 
factors that explain the effects on labor supply (the decision of ever more workers to 
withdraw early from work) there are also “push” factors that account for labor de-
mand problems, especially the tendency of firms to shed older workers. 
On the “pull” side, public policies provided unintended pathways to retire early 
(Kohli et al. 1991), for instance, disability rules were increasingly used over time for 
shedding older workers from work. Moreover, many arrangements set up for particu-
lar circumstances became generalized through peer comparisons and public expecta-
tions to all sectors and conditions: early retirement programs that had started in par-
ticular sectors became a quasi-social right for all. In fact, once a particular cohort had 
retired earlier; the following cohorts claimed the right to do the same. This holds true 
particularly in pay-as-you-go systems: workers perceive that they have already paid 
into a scheme from which their former colleagues went on early retirement and that 
they have thus earned the same right when they reach the same age. However, this 
originally unintended diffusion of early exit has had the perverse effect that welfare 
state expenditures increased and social security contributions had to be raised, leading 
to further pressures on the labor market (Esping-Andersen 1996). Once the quasi-
social right was firmly entrenched, it became very difficult for governments to reverse 
such policies, or even control the ongoing early exit regimes, not least because there 
are also “push” factors at work. This self-reinforcing diffusion process of a quasi-
social right of early withdrawal in which programs largely intended for other purposes 
are generalized exemplifies the first type of path dependent processes, the “trodden 
trail” metaphor. 
On the “push” side, employers (or personnel departments) also have good reasons to 
collude with worker representatives in shedding older workers during a phase of 
downsizing and/or to maintain a high-skill internal labor market (Ebbinghaus 2001). 
This is particularly the case when (1) public policies provide possibilities to off-load 
the costs and (2) early retirement benefits are socially acceptable to workplace repre-
sentatives. Yet there is also a mechanism of deterministic path dependence at work 
that leads to unintended consequences (in Merton’s terminology: a self-fulfilling 
prophecy). Employers defend early retirement by suggesting that older workers are 
less productive, although empirical evidence has not confirmed this belief (Casey 
1997). Regardless of the true productivity rates, once employers assume that workers 
are leaving earlier, they stop investing in continuing education or retraining measures 
for workers as their early retirement age approaches. This leads to an ever earlier out-
dating of older workers’ skill profiles, which then serves as proof of their lower pro-
ductivity – a genuine self-fulfilling prophecy. Reversing early exit trends would there-
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fore also require the altering of firm-level actors’ expectations. Thus, the largely un-
founded belief of employers about age-related productivity declines of older workers – 
in combination with firms’ use of early retirement for socially accepted restructuring 
– leads to a self-reinforcing, self-fulfilling prophecy with long-term negative effects on 
welfare states. 
4 Path dependence II: branching pathways and the structuring of alternatives 
Path-dependence is a way to narrow conceptually  
the choice set and link decision making through time.  
It is not a story of inevitability in which  
the past predicts the future. (North 1990: 98–99) 
In historical-institutionalist studies, the concept of path dependence has been used in 
a broader, non-deterministic sense: the concept “path” is not primarily used to de-
scribe the emergence and persistence of an (unchanged) institution by repeated uni-
form basic decisions of individual actors, but the long-term developmental pathway of 
an institution, or complex institutional arrangement, shaped by and then further 
adapted by collective actors. Actors are rarely in a situation in which they can ignore 
the past and decide de novo; their decisions are bound by past and current institutions. 
The main question here is: What are the consequences of path dependence for the 
further development of an institution? Or in other words: How much do past deci-
sions shape the available alternatives for future ones? The emphasis here is on the tim-
ing and sequence of events (Pierson 2004). 
A seminal application of the developmental concept was undertaken by Douglass C. 
North, who won the Nobel Prize in economics in 1993 for his work in economic his-
tory. North posed the question: Why have some societies maintained less efficient 
developmental paths (North 1990: 7)? Indeed, neo-classical competition theory and 
international trade theory are challenged by the puzzle of less efficient economic sys-
tems that are neither negatively selected nor converge towards a more productive in-
stitutional arrangement. According to North, there are three main causes that may 
explain the persistence of a suboptimal economic pathway (North 1990): 
– Transaction costs are high due to non-competitive markets – the adaptive mecha-
nisms of prizes do not work properly (cf. North/Thomas 1973). 
– Political factors obstruct the institutionalization of property rights in such a way 
that competitive markets cannot operate properly (cf. North 1981). 
– The once established institutions become locked-in through path dependent self-
reinforcement (cf. North 1990). 
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North, as many other social scientists with an historical approach, uses path depend-
ence in the double sense used in this paper as he refers both to the deterministic path 
dependence (I) of institutional lock-in due to micro-level diffusion processes as well 
as to the open developmental path dependence (II) as a sequence of macro-level insti-
tutional changes that are shaped by the lower level lock-in. Economic history is only 
one of many disciplines in the social sciences that have increasingly used the more 
open path dependence concept to describe institutional development. In fact, com-
parative historical studies of the development of modern societies have continually 
used path dependence as a concept to claim that history matters. Beginning in the 
1960s, prominent political sociologists Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan 
adopted such a path dependence view avant la lettre to explain the genesis and freez-
ing of modern party systems in Western Europe (Lipset/Rokkan 1967).8 While the 
freezing thesis – that the post-war party system was highly institutionalized – seems to 
rest on a deterministic inertia claim, their diachronical approach was very sensitive to 
variance in the timing and sequences in social and political cleavages giving rise to 
distinct party formations across Western Europe prior to the 1960s (Flora 1999). 
Three features stand out as common themes in the older and newer historical analyses 
of developmental pathways (see Figure 3): 
1. An institution emerges at a critical juncture at which collective actors establish 
new rules. The selection of a pathway is the result of political conflicts and power 
relations (Knight 1992) during a window of opportunity for action, often 
opened up through a societal crisis situation (Stinchcombe 1975). 
2. A second element is the subsequent process of institutionalization through self-
reinforcing processes, similar to those described by Arthur and David. Here, 
positive feedback allows for the societal acceptance of a newly established insti-
tution, providing legitimacy and objectivation (Berger/Luckmann [1969] 1977). 
3. The third feature is a wider understanding of path dependence in the sense of 
the sequence of contingent decisions. Earlier decisions, once institutionalized, 
“structure the alternatives” (Rokkan 1999) of later ones. 
An example of path dependence as narrowing the choice set is the juridical principle 
of precedence (and stare decisis) in the English common law tradition: courts are 
bound by past judgments and cannot divert without special reasons, thus reinforcing 
the traditional interpretation of law over long periods of time (Hathaway 2000). The 
broader concept of path dependence thus reflects the metaphor of branching path-
                                                        
8 Not only S.M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan but also Reinhard Bendix ([1964] 1977), Barrington 
Moore (1966) and Immanuel Wallerstein (1979) developed such developmental perspectives, 
however, the comparison of these trajectories served very different methodological purposes 
(Skocpol 1984; Tilly 1984): stressing similarities, uniqueness or variations on the “road to 
modernity.” 
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ways, of sequential junctures at which collective actors decide which of the available 
alternative pathways they will follow. The claim is that, depending on the timing of 
previous institutions, their subsequent degree of institutionalization, and particular 
circumstances of the juncture, the alternatives are structured, with more fundamental 
changes more costly than gradual ones. 
In contrast to the deterministic path dependence theorem that assumes chance events 
will have long-term consequences, the developmental approach focuses on the par-
ticular historical origins of institutions.9 Historical institutionalists see institutions 
emerging from more or less conscious choices by collective actors at critical junctures. 
Even if it is often impossible to precisely predict a critical juncture, for instance the fall 
of the Berlin wall in 1989, retrospective analysis can reveal the factors leading to the 
emergence of a new institution as the result of the interactions of collective action by 
individual and corporate actors in a given historical situation. However, this does not 
imply that the institution was necessarily planned or intended to operate in the way it 
actually emerged. The critical juncture model serves first and foremost as a working 
hypothesis that needs to be studied in historical comparative research. For instance, 
was the First World War a break, a catalyst, or the continuation of long-term trends in 
modern societies? 
                                                        
9 The stochastic path dependence theorem of Arthur’s polya urn model (named after George 
Polya) led many theorists of path dependence to make chance events at the beginning a pre-
condition for path dependence (Goldstone 1998; Mahoney 2000). Even if critical junctures are 
contingent events that could be started by historical coincidence or Cournot effects (Boudon 
1984: 168), macro-social change is nevertheless the result of action by collective actors and 
hardly of “small chance events.” For instance, the fall of the Berlin wall may have been trig-
gered by mistakes of the regime, but it still took a mass protest movement before and after 9 
November 1989 to accomplish regime change and political transformation. 
Figure 3 Path dependence II: branching pathways
Path stabilization
t1 t2 t3
Structuring of alternatives
Path departure
Institutionalization
Path switch
Critical juncture
b
AB
BB
Ab
Aa
A
a
 
Ebbinghaus: Can Path Dependence Explain Institutional Change? 17 
In comparison to the deterministic path dependence model, the developmental view 
allows for more openness to change. Analytically, three scenarios of institutional 
transformation can be distinguished: 
(a) path stabilization: marginal adaptation to environmental changes without 
changing core principles; 
(b) path departure: gradual adaptation through partial renewal of institutional ar-
rangements and limited redirection of core principles; 
(c) path cessation or switching: intervention that ends the self-reinforcement of an 
established institution and may give way to a new institution in its place. 
(a) If an institution is severely entrenched, we can expect path stability through mar-
ginal adaptation to changing environmental conditions to be the most likely scenario. 
Long-term stability results not only due to self-reinforcing processes that lead to 
“lock-in” (according to deterministic path dependence), but also through successful 
gradual adaptation, often stated under the motto plus ça change, plus c’est la même 
chose. However, it remains an empirical question whether such adaptations are suffi-
cient to stabilize the institution or whether institutional inertia inhibits necessary 
changes that may facilitate a path departure or even a systemic break. 
(b) A path departure becomes increasingly likely when more significant changes in the 
environment occur and the self-reinforcing mechanism provides sufficient resources 
for gradual adaptation. Here, the most relevant idea is of open path dependence, in 
which earlier decisions narrow the choice set but do not determine the next adaptive 
step. Path departure lies between locked-in inertia, when nothing effectively changes 
the basic foundation, and radical system change, when everything is built de novo. Yet 
between these extremes, path departure also entails various forms and often occurs 
through a variety of simultaneous processes: 
– Long-term gradual changes that sum up over time to important reorientations 
(Pierson 2000b). 
– A functional transformation through which the same institution serves a different 
purpose than initially intended (Thelen 2003). 
– Institutional layering occurs through the addition of (new) institutional ar-
rangements with divergent orientation (Thelen 2003). 
(c) The third and least likely possibility is radical transformation – path cessation or 
path switching. As in the case of the emergence of institutions, here we would examine 
the critical juncture at which a change in the opportunity structure led to a freeing-up 
of societal resources (Stinchcombe 1965) and allowed a shift in the path, not least 
through the actions of political entrepreneurs. In such cases, it becomes necessary to 
explain why the self-reinforcing processes have ended and how a new institution 
could be established in its stead. A voluminous literature in political sociology has 
investigated the conditions necessary for revolutionary change (see Goldstone 2003) 
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and the conditions for a paradigm change (third order change) in state policies (Hall 
1993). 
In general, we can conclude that the more open developmental perspective can in 
principle be used to analyze the different forms of institutional inertia and change. 
However, when we attempt to explain these different forms of institutional change, we 
need to go beyond the heuristics of the path dependence metaphor and study the ac-
tual processes of change (Thelen 2003). In addition, we need a theoretical underpin-
ning and empirical tests of the social mechanisms that lead to self-reinforcement or 
may even lead to deinstitutionalization. In the final part, I will turn to these “social 
mechanisms” (Hedström/Swedberg 1998), that is, middle-range theories that help to 
explain recurrent social processes such as self-reinforcing feedback. 
5 Path dependence example II: multiple pathways of welfare reform 
To give an application of the open path dependence approach, I briefly discuss multi-
ple pathways of current welfare state reform (see Figure 4). Esping-Andersen’s impor-
tant study Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1990) assumes long-
term historical political forces that shape welfare regimes, that is, the redistributive 
principles and institutional mix of social policies. At critical junctures in the forma-
tion of welfare states, new political alliances led to systemic reforms of policies dealing 
with new social risks in industrial societies (Flora/Alber 1981). Other historical alter-
natives were not taken – they became “suppressed historical alternatives” (Moore 
1978). Thus, the road towards universal citizenship pensions was foreclosed in Ger-
many through the institutionalization of the social insurance for workers under Bis-
marck in 1889 and again after the Second World War when the Adenauer govern-
ment’s pension reform of 1957 introduced a full pay-as-you-go system. 
For Esping-Andersen, societal forces and historical legacies have led to entrenched 
regimes or frozen institutional landscapes from which they can hardly escape, even 
when they result in perverse effects. For instance, the Continental European welfare 
states (Esping-Andersen 1996; Scharpf 2001) are locked into the “welfare state with-
out work” problem. They suffer the Continental dilemma: as passive labor market 
policies are used to take workers out of work to alleviate labor market disequilibria, 
the higher the social security cost pressures that in turn lead to higher labor costs and 
thus yet more pressure to shed labor. Although smaller parametric reforms have been 
implemented in an attempt to shift the costs of social security between different insur-
ance systems, these reforms did not change the status quo. Arguments in favor of path 
persistence pointed to the difficulties of altering a pay-as-you-go system due to the 
double-payer problem: the current working generation would have to pay for the ac-
quired rights of pensioners and save for their own future pensions (Pierson 1997). 
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Because the benefits of a system change would be diffused and can only be received in 
the future, welfare retrenchment would lead to immediate and concentrated cuts – a 
change in social policy that are politically difficult to achieve, particularly given the 
blame avoidance of office-seeking politicians (Myles/Pierson 2001). The pay-as-you-
go principle in social insurance is certainly a strong self-reinforcing process, resem-
bling the deterministic path dependence theorem. 
Nevertheless, several welfare states that were said to be frozen landscapes (Esping-
Andersen 1996) have been able to adopt substantial reforms (Hinrichs 2000; Taylor-
Gooby 1999; Palier 2000; Reynaud 2000). Some welfare states have been able to make 
up for missed opportunities and reintroduce “suppressed historical alternatives” in 
particular situations of crisis and then expand upon them. Thus, the Dutch intro-
duced a basic pension system after the Second World War, after emergency measures 
had temporarily set the ground and private occupational pensions had in the mean-
time filled the void of earnings-related supplements (Haverland 2001). Those pension 
systems that already had institutional arrangements, like a private second tier, would 
not have to introduce such a scheme from scratch but could use these “dormant” his-
torical alternatives to start a gradual process of transforming an old age security sys-
tem from public towards private provisions. Moreover, minor changes in the past 
could lead to a long-term gradual transformation, increasing the share of private pen-
sions through a gradual decline in benefits from the pay-as-you-go public system. 
Gradual changes could thus lead to long-term systemic recalibration of a system (i.e. 
path departure); these may also be more acceptable politically, not least because the 
changes are at first unobservable or too complicated to understand (Myles/Pierson 
2001). Grandfathering rules that exempt current pensioners from retrenchment at the 
expense of cuts for future beneficiaries have been a common device in welfare reforms 
Figure 4 Path Dependence II: Pension Reform
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negotiated by governments with trade unions, as the core union membership is ex-
empted or less affected by changes (Brugiavini et al. 2001; Ebbinghaus/Hassel 2000). 
Hence, there does exist a large variety of intermediate changes (path departure) in 
between the extreme cases of status quo maintenance (path stabilization) claimed by 
political scientists and radical system change (path switch) often advocated by econo-
mists. 
6 Institutional theories and self-reinforcing mechanisms 
Both perspectives on path dependence share the assumption that self-reinforcing 
processes foster the stabilization of institutions. Long before the path dependence 
debate, these processes have been examined as various social science theories studied 
processes labeled “institutionalization” (Berger/Luckmann [1969] 1977). Economists, 
sociologists, political scientists and historians have made various contributions to 
account for the underlying social mechanisms leading to institutional inertia. I group 
the different institutional theories and the specific mechanisms they emphasize into 
four analytical types (Mahoney 2000; Ackermann 2001). Using this schema (see Fig-
ure 5), I locate the four different social mechanisms by separating the level of interac-
tion between actors (micro-level) from the system level of institutions (macro-level), 
as well as the interaction between these two levels. I discuss these four modes of self-
reinforcing mechanisms that are used to explain institutional inertia, utilizing the 
theoretical approaches closest to them, and will then turn them upside down to ex-
plain institutional change. James Mahoney (2000) distinguishes utilitarian, function-
alist, power-related and legitimacy oriented approaches, while Rolf Ackermann (2001) 
delineates three mechanisms: coordination effects, complementarities and interde-
pendence between the regulative and action levels. In my schema, I combine each 
theoretical paradigm with the social mechanism most prominently associated with its 
approach. I separate the interdependencies between actor and institutional realm in 
interest politics (aggregation of interests from the micro to macro level) and internali-
zation (the impact of institutions on actors’ beliefs and actions, see Figure 4). 10 
                                                        
10 Ackermann (2001: 91), an economist, excludes power-based explanations (rent-seeking) from 
his analysis of institutional “inflexibility,” disregarding the factors that North (1981, 1990) 
and many others embraced in their institutional analyses. He claims that in these cases a direct 
intervention takes place and no self-reinforcing mechanism is at work (Ackermann 2001: 91). 
In contrast, I follow Mahoney sociological perspective and include the power-based explana-
tions of path dependence here because of its importance in institution building (see also Sha-
lev 2001) that has been most prominent in the old institutionalism in sociology (Stinchcombe 
1997) and in the new politics institutionalism (Pierson 2000a). 
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(a) Utilitarian theories (institutional economics and rational choice theory in sociol-
ogy) start from the assumption of rational behavior and focus on coordination prob-
lems among individuals.11 In this micro-level perspective, the emergence and stability 
of social institutions is seen as a collective action problem (Olson 1965). A social con-
vention only develops spontaneously when enough actors see sufficient personal util-
ity in it and are willing to contribute to produce a public good. A coordination effect 
may derive from the network economies of scale: the more users in a network that par-
ticipate, the more everyone (old and new users) will profit from it. An example from 
geography is the agglomeration effect (Arthur 1994: Chapter 4, 6). For a variety of rea-
sons, the first computer software firms started up near Stanford University, but with 
increased numbers in Silicon Valley the regional concentration became a positive lo-
cation factor, attracting ever more computer firms. 
(b) Political institutionalists in political science focus on the role of political institu-
tions and intermediary interest organizations (cf. Hall/Taylor 1996; Thelen 1999).12 
                                                        
11 Institutional economics subsumes a variety of theories looking at property-rights, transaction 
costs and principal-agent relations (Martiensen 2000; Erlei et al. 1999; Furubotn/Richter 
2000). Rational choice (RC) theories assume rational action of individual actors and explain 
institutions as rational coordination games; RC-theory is promient in American political in-
stitutional analysis (Weingast 1996) and sociological studies of collective action (Elster 2000; 
Hechter/Kanazawa 1997), following in the tradition of Olson (1965). 
12 While this approach is known in political science as “New Institutionalism” and historical 
institutionalism (cf. Hall /Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998; Steinmo et al. 1992; Thelen 1999), it 
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On the one hand, social groupings have vested sectionalist interests that they seek to 
pursue in politics. On the other hand, political institutions and politics shape the op-
portunity structure and strategic preferences for political action in society. Path de-
pendence in politics may thus result from policy feedbacks through which political 
institutions shape the interest groupings that are in favor of maintaining a particular 
status quo (Pierson 1993). An historical example is the German pension insurance for 
white-collar employees that helped to reinforce and maintain status differences for a 
century and also led to the separate trade union organization of white-collar interests 
(Kocka 1981; see also Esping-Andersen/Korpi 1984). 
(c) Functionalist system theory (Parsons/Smelser 1956) but also more implicitly the 
new political economy (Hall/Soskice 2001) explain the endurance of institutions 
through their “embedding” into the overall institutional landscape (Granovetter 
1985).13 Complementary institutions are interconnected and mutually support each 
other (Milgrom/Roberts 1994; Schmidt/Spindler 2002). An example of such com-
plementarities is the German dual vocational training system and the diversified qual-
ity production system it supports (Soskice 1999). The two systems are functionally 
interdependent: the vocational training system provides the supply and the produc-
tion system the demand for highly skilled workers. Even though we should avoid the 
functionalist pitfall of reading the origins of institutions into their later function 
(Stinchcombe 1968), once complementarities emerge interdependent institutions do 
tend to persist (Thelen/Kume 2001). 
(d) Sociological institutionalism has focused since Emile Durkheim on the normative 
function of institutions. In addition, cognitive dimensions of institutionalization (in-
ternalization) may also reinforce path dependent persistence: dominant behavioral 
norms in societies are internalized as cognitive schemata and are socialized as taken-
for-granted routines that are no longer questioned (Zucker 1977). The new instititu-
tionalism in organizational sociology stresses socially accepted routines (Powell/Di-
Maggio 1991). Organizations adopt institutional isomorphism by copying institutions 
not for efficiency reasons, but because they are perceived to be legitimate and appro-
priate (DiMaggio/Powell 1983). An example of isomorphism is the transplantation of 
the Western German model of university structures to Eastern German tertiary educa-
tion after the fall of the socialist regime. The Eastern states’ adoption of an established 
institutional form, despite being increasingly criticized in the West, provided the nec-
essary legitimacy to attract academics, students and resources. 
                                                                                                                                                       
should not to be confused with the neo-institutionalism in organizational analysis (see be-
low). 
13 For functionalist system theory, see Parsons (1956, [1951] 1991) and Stinchcombe (1968). 
The comparative political economy approach (Crouch/Streeck 1997; Hollingsworth/Boyer 
1997; Hall /Soskice 2001; Aoki 2001) stresses the institutional embedding of production sys-
tems and analyzes their institutional complementarities (for a discussion of its underlying 
functionalism see Lütz 2003). 
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From quite different theoretical standpoints, institutional theories use these four so-
cial mechanisms to explain institutionalization, leading to an institution’s persistence. 
Yet, we need further empirical studies to test whether and which of these social me-
chanisms are actually at work and if they indeed are causal in stabilizing a particular 
institution. Only if such self-reinforcing mechanisms are shown to exist, can institu-
tional theories claim to explain the observed path dependence of institutions. 
A central avenue for future research will be to examine whether the processes of insti-
tutional change can be explained with the same self-reinforcing social mechanisms 
simply by turning it upside down. While the chances for path departure may increase 
with the long-term erosion of self-reinforcing processes (deinstitutionalization), insti-
tutional change may also occur suddenly due to historically contingent events that 
provoke a path cessation or even path switch. Mirroring the discussion of the four 
social mechanisms used to explain institutional inertia above, the arguments may be 
turned around to address the cases of path departure and even path cessation. 
(a) In the case of coordination effects, path departure could occur through declining 
economies of scale or through a transformation of the purpose of an existing 
network. For instance, in the example of agglomeration effects, there could be 
limits to growth through overcrowding. Moreover, political entrepreneurs in 
other locations may consciously seek to build a competing network with similar 
scale effects through policies sponsoring relocation. 
(b) Shifts in power relations and new interest groupings are potential causes for po-
litically induced institutional change (Stinchcombe 1968). However, the oppor-
tunity costs for political action are differently structured depending upon the in-
stitutional context (Immergut 1991): there are often multiple veto points in po-
litical decision-making structures that provide leverage to block reforms. 
Changes in the institutional power structure and the decline in mobilizing 
power would thus alter the political conditions for a status quo coalition. For in-
stance, the decline in union membership and government-induced reforms of 
the social partners’ self-administration in social insurance schemes increased the 
possibilities for reform in the Netherlands (Visser/Hemerijck 1997). 
(c) Path departure could occur under conditions of institutional interdependence 
when complementarities wane. While the interlocking between institutions may 
loosen, an institution may be also endangered through tight coupling with an-
other institution if this complementary institution can no longer provide or has 
changed its function due to external changes. Thus, the increasing erosion of the 
voluntary dual vocational training system due to externally induced reasons can 
have major long-term repercussions on the skill profiles of German firms. 
(d) Deinstitutionalization may occur through a change in normative or cognitive 
processes. This could happen through the delegitimation of an institution, if the 
script becomes less and less appropriate to real world contexts. New ideas may 
also lead to paradigm shifts that call taken-for-granted routines into question 
(Lieberman 2002). Thus, postmodern value changes and new lifestyles have led 
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to the erosion of traditional social norms without necessarily replacing them by 
new commonly held norms. 
 
Table 1 Two models of path dependence  
 Path dependence I Path dependence II 
Metaphor Trodden trail Road juncture 
Process Diffusion of social norm Structuring of alternatives 
Model Polya urn (see Figure 1) Decision tree (see Figure 3) 
Events Repetition of basic decision Sequence of institutional changes 
Level Social network of individuals  
(micro-level) 
Collective or corporate actors  
(macro-level) 
Beginning Small chance events Major critical juncture 
Momentum  “Tipping point”: critical mass  
of innovators 
Later junctures: full, partial or  
no institutional persistence 
Outcome Deterministic persistence (inertia) 
through self-reinforcement 
Open process of institutional 
change 
Self-reinforcement  
mechanisms 
Coordination (network effects); vested interests (sunk costs); institutional 
complementarities (system effects); internalization (taken-for-granted) 
Institutional change External to model (inertia only) Varying: path stabilization,  
departure, switch or cessation 
Factors of change Only exogenous Endogenous (e.g. deinstitutionali-
zation) and exogenous (e.g. revo-
lution) 
The study of the social mechanisms of institutional change is certainly still at its be-
ginning (Thelen 2002), partly because the theoretical and empirical work on institu-
tions has thus far concentrated on resistance to change. The deterministic conception 
of path dependence (I) based on studies of technological innovation has led to a nar-
row conception of institutional change as non-change (or inertia). The polya urn, 
given its parsimonious but closed system view, has shaped our understanding of path 
dependence in a limiting way. The model as such is only an illustration and can nei-
ther predict the timing and outcome of the tipping-point, nor does it explain the self-
reinforcement process. Increasing attention to the social mechanisms underlying 
processes of institutionalization has provided more insights into the possible factors 
contributing to institutional inertia. However, it is the more open path dependence 
(II) approach delineated above that leads to an increasing attention to institutional 
change. Adherents to the second perspective study a wider range of long-term institu-
tional evolutionary processes and thus provide ample evidence for a variety of forms 
in path developments: path continuation, departure, switching or cessation. Although 
a variety of examples was presented here, the taxonomy of such changes is still being 
developed, and the social mechanisms and conditions for the different forms have not 
yet been clearly delineated. 
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7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, I would like to sum up my arguments concerning path dependence and 
institutional change in four main points (see Table 1). First, path dependence is a 
concept with at least two established meanings in institutional research that refer to 
distinct phenomena: micro-level diffusion processes in social networks and macro-
level institutional arrangements that shape subsequent (political) decision-making. 
The first model is fitted to repeated decisions that reinforce each other, given sunk 
costs, coordination effects, cognitive schemas and vested interests. The empirical ex-
amples of the entrenchment of early retirement policies indicate that such processes 
may lead to unintended consequences, yet that reform is very difficult given institu-
tional lock-in. Second, the deterministic path dependence theorem can only model 
the persistence of diffusion processes under relatively restrictive conditions, that is, 
unabated self-reinforcement without external intervention. It can explain neither the 
emergence nor the change of institutions, since it leaves the former to chance (sto-
chastic tipping point) and rules out the latter (no endogenous capacity for change). 
Third, the more open developmental approach has thus far served largely as a heuris-
tic for historical research that is flexible enough to describe institutional persistence 
and change. Certainly, we need to theoretically specify and empirically confirm the 
social mechanisms of institutionalization and later changes in historical process analy-
ses. Research on welfare state reform has provided new insights into the openness and 
variety of path dependent changes. Fourth, if institutional path dependence structures 
the alternatives of subsequent decisions, then it should be possible to systematically 
study the varying impact of institutional configurations on institutional change and 
persistence using cross-national comparative analysis. To do just that in the future, we 
need to develop middle-range theories of institutional change that go beyond a crude 
fixation on path dependence as persistence and instead help us to explore the poten-
tial for path departure that is institutional change in its proper sense. This paper indi-
cates the need for and potential of such an endeavor. 
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